Speculation on the Emerging Post-Liberal World Order
Right-Wing Rebels, Great Powers, and the Race for AGI
This piece was originally commissioned for Skeptic magazine, but was ultimately reworked into to be about anti-elite sentiment, which will be coming out next month. Since Trump and Putin just met in Alaska to begin winding down the Russia-Ukraine war (sans Zelensky), with an offer for Trump to come to Moscow in the near future to refine the deal, I thought it’d be prudent to release this now. This is not an endorsement of what I think will transpire, but rather just a reading of the tea leaves of where I see things heading.
Over the past decade, a profound schism has cleaved the global political landscape, pitting right-wing populists against progressive elites in a confrontation that extends far beyond domestic grievances to signal a seismic shift in the international order. At the forefront of this populist surge stand figures like Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Marine Le Pen in France, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary, each channeling widespread discontent to challenge the technocratic hegemony of institutions such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the European Union (EU). This clash is not a mere rebellion of the disregarded against the overprivileged; it constitutes a calculated geopolitical maneuver best understood within the realist framework of John Mearsheimer, whose Great Powers Theory would say that there are only three nations that currently matter as contenders for global leadership: The United States, Russia, and China.1 Within this triad, the most perilous outcome for any one power is an alliance between the other two, a scenario MAGA appears intent on preempting by steering America into alignment with Russia to counterbalance China’s ascendance.
Central to this strategy is the race for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), a technological breakthrough poised to rival the invention of nuclear weapons in its capacity to redefine global dominance, offering the victor unprecedented economic, military, and cultural leverage. The United States must win this race to maintain global hegemony, or at the very least, make sure that China does not win it - A Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the first AGI means global domination on and off the modern battlefield and, at least in theory, a global Social Credit System regime for every nation that they would be able to force under their influence.
To fortify this alignment, MAGA and its populist counterparts are likely aiming to recruit allies in regions where right-wing movements are gaining electoral traction, most notably in Europe and South America. Potential allies could include Fidesz (Hungary), Fratelli d’Italia (Italy), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Poland), Rassemblement National (France), Partido Liberal (Brazil), भारतीय जनता पार्टी [Bharatiya Janata Party] (India), La Libertad Avanza (Argentina), Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), ליכוד [Likud] (Israel), Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Turkey), and Nuevas Ideas (El Salvador), though ideological and strategic differences may complicate some of these alignments.
Yet, both populists and elites falter under rigorous scrutiny, relying on untested narratives rather than empirical rigor, thereby jeopardizing the health, wealth, and stability of nations entangled in this high-stakes contest. This essay employs three principles of rational inquiry: demanding empirical evidence over narrative, assessing outcomes objectively, and testing claims against alternative explanations in order to dissect this dynamic, exposing flaws that necessitate a skeptical perspective and offering a framework to navigate the unfolding showdown.
The first principle of rational inquiry asserts that objective reality exists and must be substantiated by testable evidence, not anecdote, rhetoric, or ideological fiat.2 Populists, with MAGA at the vanguard, frame their rise as a rejection of elite-driven globalism, a borderless, technocratic vision epitomized by the WEF’s “Great Reset” and the EU’s supranational governance. However, I suspect that there is a deeper strategic intent below the surface, and my argument that the United States is aligning itself with Russia to thwart China rests on a paucity of public data.
Trump’s 2024 campaign largely avoided explicit pronouncements on this geopolitical pivot, yet his administration’s actions provide clues: a softened rhetoric toward Moscow, exemplified by repeated praise of Vladimir Putin’s “strength” and “leadership” on social media platforms, contrasts sharply with an unrelenting hardline stance against Beijing, including sustained tariffs, technology export bans, and public denunciations of China’s economic practices.3 This shift is not isolated to the U.S. In Romania, Călin Georgescu’s surprising 22% first-round victory in the 2024 presidential election capitalized on anti-EU sentiment and pro-sovereignty narratives that resonate with Russian interests, though no formal trade agreements, military pacts, or diplomatic communiqués have surfaced to confirm an explicit alignment.4
Hungary’s Viktor Orbán offers another case, maintaining a decade-long rapport with Putin, evidenced by energy deals and summits, while resisting EU sanctions, a stance that dovetails with MAGA’s broader vision.4 The AGI component of this strategy introduces further ambiguity. Elon Musk’s ventures, Neuralink and xAI, closely tied to MAGA’s intellectual orbit, signal a concerted push toward advanced AI, yet no public evidence confirms a U.S. lead in AGI development, with government R&D budgets and private sector outputs remaining opaque on this front. Elites, in response, wield their own untested narratives to counter this populist tide. Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled Georgescu’s 2024 election, citing “Russian meddling” and “disinformation,” yet failed to produce vote audits, intercepted communications, or forensic analyses to substantiate the charge, leaving the decision mired in suspicion.4
In France, Marine Le Pen’s conviction on March 31, 2025, for “embezzling EU funds,” resulting in a five-year ban from the 2027 presidential race as her National Rally polled near 30%, rested on procedural irregularities rather than definitive proof of financial misconduct, raising questions of political timing given her party’s threat to EU cohesion.5 Similarly, Jair Bolsonaro’s treason charges following the January 8, 2023, protests in Brazil allege a coup attempt, yet no documented ties to Russian influence or AGI-related ambitions have emerged from judicial proceedings, rendering the elite narrative speculative.6 Both camps, populists hinting at a grand realignment, elites decrying interference, fall short of the skeptic’s demand for tangible evidence: trade statistics, technological benchmarks, or diplomatic correspondences that could illuminate their claims.
The second principle, assessing outcomes objectively, mandates consistent and accurate measurement of results, eschewing selective framing to fit preconceived agendas.7 MAGA’s strategic alignment with Russia aims to curb China’s economic and technological rise (China’s GDP reached $19 trillion in 2024 against the U.S.’s $27 trillion) while positioning America to seize AGI primacy, a goal deemed critical to maintaining great power status.15 Trump’s first term offers a partial scorecard: trade with China dropped 17% between 2018 and 2020 due to tariffs, while U.S.-Russia energy exports rose modestly by 5%, reflecting a tentative warming.8 Post-2024, federal R&D spending increased by 12%, with allocations to AI research, yet no breakthrough in AGI has been publicly confirmed, leaving the U.S.’s position in this race uncertain.15 The recruitment of secondary populist allies yields mixed results.
In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s tenure (2019–2022) delivered a sluggish 1.2% GDP growth rate in 2022, trailing regional peers like Chile at 2.4%, while violent crime, though reduced by 11%, remained high at 20 per 100,000, undermining claims of enhanced national health or wealth.8 In France, Le Pen’s regional strongholds, such as Hauts-de-France, report unemployment at 8.2% against a national average of 7.4%, with wage growth lagging, offering little evidence of economic uplift despite her party’s electoral strength.9 Hungary’s Orbán, a potential linchpin in this coalition, has stabilized GDP growth at 2–3% annually since 2010, bolstered by Russian energy deals, yet his defiance of EU norms has isolated Hungary economically within the bloc.4 Romania’s Georgescu, with his election annulled, never had the chance to test his Russia-leaning policies, leaving outcomes hypothetical.4 In South America, Argentina’s Javier Milei, elected in 2023, pursues a libertarian-populist agenda that aligns ideologically with MAGA, yet his early tenure has been marked by economic volatility, 40% inflation in 2024, rather than coalition-building success.4
Elites’ counter strategy of lawfare, intended to safeguard stability, frequently backfires. Le Pen’s 2025 ban sparked widespread protests across rural and working-class France, reinforcing her base rather than diminishing it, with National Rally support holding firm.10 Bolsonaro’s legal challenges, culminating in a 2030 office ban, failed to quell his influence, as evidenced by mass rallies into 2025, drawing tens of thousands in São Paulo and Brasília. In Britain, Tommy Robinson’s October 2024 jailing for contempt, after screening a film alleging “grooming gangs” with over 1,500 convictions since 2000, ignited unrest in London and northern cities, reflecting widespread concern over free speech, as a 2021 survey found 44% of Britons fear expressing their political views due to cancel culture.11,12 Neither side excels at objective assessment: populists tout a nascent bloc without proving its efficacy, elites deploy legal tools that exacerbate division, and the AGI race, where China continues to advance significantly in AI technology, remains a critical unknown.15
The third principle, testing claims against alternative explanations, insists that correlation does not equate to causation without rigorous evidence.13 Populists attribute their electoral success to elite overreach (e.g., open borders, green mandates, and supranational control), positioning their alignment with Russia as a bulwark against China’s ongoing ascent. Public discontent with the EU is measurable, with trust falling to 47% in 2023, and China’s technological dominance, particularly in 5G and AI, stokes legitimate fears.14,15 Yet alternative drivers abound.
Economic stagnation like France’s GDP growth at 1.1% in 2023, or immigration anxieties like 62% of Germans expressing concern in 2023, could equally fuel populist support, independent of elite policies.14 Trump’s 2024 victory leaned heavily on domestic inflation, which hit 4.1%, as much as on anti-China sentiment, suggesting a broader discontent beyond geopolitical framing.15 AGI’s strategic weight is undeniable, Mearsheimer views technological mastery as a cornerstone of power, but Russia’s role as a vital energy supplier, with its vast reserves fueling the immense computational needs of AGI, offsets doubts raised by its $2 trillion GDP and lagging AI sector.
Elites, conversely, pin destabilization on populist agitation like Brazil’s January 8, 2023 protests and Trump’s January 6 legacy serve as Exhibits A and B, yet deeper currents of distrust, with 62% of Americans skeptical of government in 2023, or wage stagnation across Western economies, may be the true catalysts.16 Lawfare has constantly been suspiciously timed deployment (e.g.Le Pen’s ban as her party surged, Bolsonaro’s charges post-electoral loss, Georgescu’s annulment aligning with NATO interests), which hints at political expediency rather than principled defense of democracy. Untested alternatives, such as economic despair or elite misgovernance, muddy the causal waters. Comparative analyses of populist-led regions versus elite-governed ones, or tech race metrics could disentangle these threads, yet both sides cling to their unproven narratives, eschewing the skeptic’s call for empirical clarity.
This populist-elite divide, and the great power realignment it portends, runs afoul of established social science insights. Tribalism, a well-documented phenomenon, underpins MAGA’s tentative embrace of Russia and the elite fixation on China as threats, fostering an “us versus them” dynamic that entrenches division rather than forging alliances.17 Expectancy effects amplify this rift: populist warnings of an AGI-enabled Chinese hegemony and elite branding of populists as existential dangers prime their respective constituencies for conflict, not cooperation, a pattern corroborated by psychological research on belief reinforcement.19 Availability bias further distorts perceptions, elevating high-profile incidents, such as Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric, Le Pen’s legal ouster, amd Robinson’s imprisonment, above systemic trends like economic decline or technological competition.20 These contradictions are not merely academic; they undermine the coherence of both populist and elite strategies, rendering their pursuit of national health and wealth precarious at best.
What propels this departure from rational inquiry? My-side bias offers a compelling explanation, as both camps process evidence through partisan lenses.21 Populists overlook Russia’s economic frailties and the unproven efficacy of their allied governments, while elites downplay lawfare’s counterproductive backlash, from Le Pen’s emboldened base to Bolsonaro’s defiant rallies. Institutional dynamics exacerbate this bias. Mainstream media amplifies MAGA’s bombast, with Trump’s social media outbursts dominating news cycles, while academia, with an 8:1 liberal-to-conservative ratio, stifles dissent against elite tactics, fostering echo chambers over open debate.22 Fear compounds the problem as populists face cancellation or legal reprisals, while elite critics risk professional ostracism within a conformist academy. This environment suppresses the skepticism essential to testing claims, leaving the marketplace of ideas a monopoly of assertion rather than a crucible of truth.
Restoring rational inquiry demands a multifaceted response. First, debate must be normalized, transforming the MAGA-Russia-China alignment and the AGI race into subjects of rigorous, data-driven scrutiny rather than ideological battlegrounds. Public forums, academic symposia, and media platforms could model this shift by dissecting cases like Le Pen’s ban or Musk’s AI ventures with evidence, not outrage. Second, evidence must take precedence over narrative, with policymakers and scholars prioritizing concrete metrics like trade balances, technological patents, electoral outcomes, and public trust indices, over the seductive pull of unverified stories; government transparency on R&D investments or diplomatic engagements could anchor this effort. Third, rigorous testing must supplant assumption, employing comparative studies (e.g., economic performance in populist-led Hungary versus elite-led Germany) or adversarial collaborations between populist and elite thinkers to isolate causal factors in this realignment and the AGI contest.23 Such approaches could illuminate whether MAGA’s strategy strengthens America’s hand or merely fuels chaos, and whether elite resistance preserves stability or accelerates decline.
MAGA’s gambit to align with Russia against China, driven by the pursuit of AGI and bolstered by a network of populist allies in Europe and South America, represents a bold bid to reshape the global order. Yet it rests on untested premises like Russia’s capacity as a partner, the feasibility of a populist coalition, the immediacy of an AGI breakthrough, which could crumble under skeptical scrutiny. Elites, with their reliance on lawfare and narrative-driven countermeasures, fare no better, with their actions amplifying division rather than securing the health and wealth of nations. The stakes are monumental: AGI, like nuclear weapons before it, promises to tip the balance of power, and the great power triad will determine the outcome and the future. Reason, grounded in evidence, objective outcomes, and tested explanations, offers the only path through this showdown, cutting through the fog of rhetoric to reveal the contours of a world in flux.
Endnotes
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.
Merton, R. K. (1973). The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. University of Chicago Press.
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Gessler, T., & Wunsch, N. (2025). "A New Regime Divide? Democratic Backsliding, Attitudes Towards Democracy and Affective Polarization." European Journal of Political Research.
Pineau, E., & Jabkhiro, J. (2025). "France's Le Pen Convicted of Graft, Barred from Running for President in 2027." Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-faces-crunch-day-graft-trial-that-could-kill-her-presidential-2025-03-31/
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Associated Press. (2023). "Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro Barred from Running for Office Until 2030 Over Electronic Voting Attacks." NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-barred-running-office-electronic-voting-court-rcna92160
Home Office. (2021). "Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation: Characteristics of Offending." https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/group-based-child-sexual-exploitation-characteristics-of-offending
Smith, M. (2021). "Cancel Culture: What Views Are Britons Afraid to Express?" YouGov. https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/40111-cancel-culture-what-views-are-britons-afraid-expre
Hill, A. B. (1965). "The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?" Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 58(5), 295–300.
Eurobarometer. (2023). "Standard Eurobarometer 99." https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2355
World Economic Forum. (2025). "AI, Tech and the Intelligent Age at Davos 2025: What to Know." https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/industries-in-the-intelligent-age-ai-tech-theme-davos-2025/
Pew Research Center. (2023). "Public Trust in Government: 1958–2023." https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/public-trust-in-government-1958-2023/
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.
Sherif, M. (1966). Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. Routledge.
Kirsch, I. (1997). "Specifying Nonspecifics: Psychological Mechanisms of Placebo Effects." American Psychologist, 52(4), 328–339.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008). "On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases and Cognitive Ability." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(4), 672–695.
Duarte, J. L., et al. (2015). "Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, e130.
Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.